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In other words, if there is an irreducibility to the act of claiming rights, 
then they cannot simply be given, and the "I" that claims them for itself 
cannot be given either but must occur only in relation with an other, an 
other that always implies the possibility of the dispropriation of oneself 
and one's "rights" and "property," an other whose inevitability is this 
experience of disproportion, i.e. of language as something other than a 
system of signs or representations. 
-Thornas Keenan 
Excerpted from "Deconstruction and the Impossibility of Justice," Public 6: Violence, 1992. 
Scale 
A defining quality of the turn of this century is a new or at least hitherto 
unknown sense of scale. The verb "to scale" means to "represent in pro- 
portional dimensions," to find "commensurable" representations of real- 
ity. Whether in the context of technology (how high can a building be built 
before the proportions of gravity and steel collapse?) or of judgement and 
ethics (what does it mean to have a sense of proportion?), the human sense 
of scale has dynamically transformed: coordinates of time and space, coef- 
ficients of rate of change, social parameters of normativity. Technologi- 
cally, the world is faster than perhaps ever before: SPEED is the maxim of 
the twentieth century. But SIZE in relation to scale has moved in two 
opposite directions, both "bigger and better," and, especially in the realm 
of the virtual, "better, faster, smaller." The question is: how does the 
human body, and its proportions and scale, respond? Where do humans fit 
themselves, limited by a mere three dimensions of space and the obstinate 
shadow of death, in a social spaceltime in which metaphors of velocity, 
amplitude, and compactness dominate? The "perfect" proportions of Da 
Vinci's Vetruvian Man, arrayed around his centre of gravity, no longer hold. 
What is needed, ironically, is a new perspective on scale. 
The human's sense of scale is, on one hand, as limitless as her vertigi- 
nous imagination. In The Matrix (1999) Neo is asked the question, "What 
do you need?" He responds, "Guns. Lots of Guns." The rush of gun racks 
and ammunition that are conjured in the white limbo of the film's virtual 
reality trail into infinite perspectival space: more guns than he and Trinity 
could ever "realistically" use, but at their disposal nonetheless. This CGI 
visual effect is conceptually no more complicated than the copy-and-paste 
command of any word-processing program. Its limit is the physical capac- 
ity of computer memory and optical resolution, each of which grows 
exponentially larger and more refined by the day. The scale of human 
inquiry, observation, and power is larger than had ever been conceived in 
earlier centuries whether the field is computer imagery, infinitesimal sub- 
atomic particles, or (more materially) the reach of media and other com- 
modities in the globalized economy. 
The human sense of scale is, on the other hand, as susceptible and bound 
as frail bodies are with the limits of corporeal time and space. Even as 
genetics and drugs and cyborg technologies reinvent the body, and new con- 
ceptions of sexuality and gender and race (as Bulworth hopes, everyone 
fucking everybody until we're all the same colour) liberate the body, certain 
constants remain: death, the twenty-four hour day, the need for sleep, food, 
shelter, perhaps even touch. At the (ominous) risk of imposing universal or 
prescriptive standards of "commensurable" scale, attention must be paid to 
the limits of mutability of body and mind. As history shows, human adapt- 
ability in the name of human survival has consequences for social ethics: 
the "enormity" of barbarism constitutes another test of scale. 
One of the most knotted issues of the twentieth century has been the 
effect of "the media" on human society. How have increasingly elaborated 
systems of representation and communication-print, aural, visual- 
affected the human sense of reality? Hypodermic theories of media influ- 
ence, favourites of the Right, are reductive: human subjects have always 
complexly negotiated social discourses, including those of visual media. 
The students of Columbine High school who massacred their fellow stu- 
dents in 1999 did not see T h e  Basketball Diaries (or T h e  Matr ix )  and 
decide to kill. Given the chance, all humans can potentially distinguish be- 
tween representation and reality. 
As the allegory of The Matrix proposes, however, humans may not 
always be given the chance. One of the most interesting and disturbing 
buzz words of the North American video game industry (which boasts 
larger sales than the film industry) is "immersion." The goal of every video 
game maker is to immerse the player in the world (diegetic, conceptual, 
ideological) of the game; hooked, the player is a loyal consumer. What 
happens to the human sense of scale with this immersion? Like the fetal 
subjects immersed in amniotic fluid in The  Matrix (or gamblers in the casi- 
nos of Las Vegas) humans are invited not to look out and see the dimen- 
sions of the world outside the game. Like players trapped in the confines 
of the labyrinth, the larger picture is obscured; the sense of scale is limited 
by the perspective inside the maze. 
What is perhaps "new" about the human sense of scale at this turn of 
the century is the intimacy of representations of reality with the body's 
sense of scale. The amplitude of the media is crushing: the subject of urban 
technological space is surrounded. The compactness of the media makes it 
portable and close. Finally, the media offers the prospect of almost endless 
immersion. Humans will continue always to potentially distinguish reality 
from representations of reality. But if sixteen out of twenty-four waking 
hours are spent immersed, surrounded and invaded by representations (the 
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other eight in dream), the real world effectively becomes defined by the 
terms of the representation. The psychological effects of this immersion 
are felt most tangibly and disastrously in psychotics, those predisposed to 
unclear boundaries between reality and fantasy. But attention must be 
paid to the effects of immersion in media to human sense of scale. Not 
only time and space but the ethics of human relations to others are at  
stake. 
-Michael Zryd 
Screen 
at the source of each emotion, there is an 
abstraction whose effect is the emotion but whose 
consequences derive from the fixity of the gaze and 
ideas. Each abstraction is a potential form in mental 
space. And when the abstraction takes shape, it 
inscribes itself radically as enigma and affirmation. 
Resorting to abstraction is a necessity for the woman 
who, tempted by existence, invents the project of 
going beyond routine daily anecdotes and the 
memories of Utopia she meets each time she uses 
language. 
By beginning with the word woman in connection 
with Utopia, M.V. had chosen to concentrate on an 
abstraction of which she had an inkling. From the 
moment when M.V. had used the peneric body as ex- 
pression, I knew that behind her the screen would be 
lowered and she would be projected into my universe. 
She would have no other choice but to agree. Agree is 
visible the only verb that can allow verisimilitude 
here, the transparency of utopian silklself (in my 
universe, Utopia would be a fiction from which would 
be born the generic body of the thinking woman). I 
would not have to make another woman be born from 
a first woman. I would have in mind only the idea that 
she might be the woman through whom everything 
could happen. In writing it, I would have everything 
for imagining an abstract woman who would slip into 
my text, carrying the fiction so far that from afar, this 
woman participant in words, must be seen coming, 
virtual to infinity, form-elle in every dimension of 
understanding, method and memory. I would not have 
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to invent her in the fiction. The fiction would be the 
finishing line of her thought. The precise term. 
Itinerant and so much a woman. Brain - - - - - 
- - - memory. Night, numbers and letters. At the 
ultimate equation. I would loom into view. 
Time becomes process in the ultra-violet. I am the 
thought of a woman who embodies me and whom I 
think integral. SKIN (UTOPIA) gesture is going to 
come. Gravitate serial and engrave the banks with 
suspended islands. I shall then be tempted by reality 
like a verbal vision which alternates my senses while 
another woman conquers the horizon at work. 
Utopia integral woman 
Gesture is going to  come: a sign I'd trace, a letter that 
would reflect me in two different voices I would be 
radically thinking like a ray of light, irrigating the 
root, absolute reality. The generic body would become 
the expression of woman and woman would have 
wings above all, she'd make (a) sign. Plunged into the 
centre of the city, I would dream of raising my eyes. 
FEMME SKIN TRAJECTOIRE. Donna lesbiana 
dome of knowledge and helix, already I'd have 
entered into a spiral and my being of air aerial urban 
would reproduce itself in the glass city like an origin. 
I'd see this manifestly formal woman then inscribe 
reality, ecosystem. 
From there, I'd begin, the woman in me like a centre 
of attraction. Surely life if life has a term death would 
be another, concentrated like a neuron, still it would 
normally be a sign. I am on the side of life if I die in 
slow motion, I occupy space in Utopia. I can push 
death away like a mother and a future. Brilliancy, 
amazement today that energy the lively affirmation of 
mental territory is a space at the turning point of 
cosmic breasts. J'EVOQUE. JE CERTIFIE M O N  
ESPOIR. SKIN. Utopia slow vertigo. I work on the 
context of the already written of our bodies' 
fluorescence, I perform the rite and temptation of 
certainty so that it ramifies. I would see a formal 
woman opening up to a sense because I know that each 
image of woman is vital in the thinking organism 
- - - -  gyno-cortex. At the end of patriarchal night 
the body anticipates on the horizon I have in front of 
me on the screen of skin, mine, whose resonance 
endures in what weaves the textlure tlissue the light 
when under my mouth the reason of the world streams 
down. M.V. agreed. In her eyes, it was epidermic this 
will for serial circulation of spatial gestures which the 
letter had initiated. Skin. 
At grips with the book, baroquing. Sweat beads. 
Resort to the window to track down sonorities, poetry 
passes through the millennia1 quotidian in order to 
come back to the idea of her I have been following 
well beyond my natural inclination, she who pre- 
occupied thought has seen words come like 
foreseeable attacks and changed their course. She is 
the one who inhabits me and who familiarizes me 
with the universe. Scintillates in me. All the sub- 
jectivity in the world. 
Utopia shines in my eyes. Langu age is feverish like a 
polysemic resource. The point of no return for all 
amorous affirmation is reached. I am there where "the 
magical appearance" begins, the coherence of 
wor(l)ds, perforated by invisible spirals that quicken 
it. I slip outside the place named carried away by the 
thought of a woman converging. Anatomical slice of 
the imaginary: to be cut off from linear cities to 
undertake my dream in duration, helmeted, virtual 
like the woman who gathers up her understandings for 
a book. 
M.V. had straightened herself up, slowly turned her 
head her gaze caught between the window ledge and 
the horizon. Le poitme hurlait opening the mind 
-Nicole Brossard 
"Screen Skin Utopia," trans. Barbara Godard. From Public 12: Utopias, 1995. 
Sexist 
An outmoded allegation. Not as bad as racist or feminist. 
-Janine Marchessault 
Share 
mine 
-Dorit Cypis 
Sleepwalker 
Dear J, 
Not much has changed. Well, of course it's quieter. And the food is good 
enough, not too salty, but not really filling either. I got lucky with a south- 
facing window, so the afternoons are bright. On Wednesdays the book- 
mobile comes. You have to order two weeks ahead, or you're stuck with 
whatever's in the van. Westerns, Tom Clancy books, self-help for men, 
and, believe it or not, travel books. They're all paperbacks, because you 
can beat yourself to death with a hardcover. 
I read, work out, play checkers in the basement with the nurses, and I 
count things: peas on a plate, stitches on my pants leg, letters per page, 
because I can't sleep and numbers are everything. We're built with num- 
bers, DNA is just blood math. So like I said, no changes. I'm awful quiet 
and I'm too fat and I'm up all night. Just like always. Ha ha. 
If I'm still night roaming I don't know it. I might get up to take a piss, 
but everybody does that half awake. If I am doing stuff, they don't tell me. 
I suppose I'd try the door over and over, maybe, or fix the bed and get into 
it again. I'd do things that would make sense for my situation. 
I was never one of those night roamers who drove all the way out to the 
airport in pajamas just to get a chocolate bar, or sat up with the oven on 
making butter tarts. Half that action's just play acting. I think they know 
it too. I always did sensible things. Rake the yard in the fall, empty the 
dishwasher. You remember. Did it scare you? I'm sorry if it did. You can't 
catch it from me. It doesn't pass from parent to child. You'll probably be 
bald, though. Ha ha, God knows my Dad was at my age. 
We're going to the Supreme Court, it's been decided. I'm glad. I don't 
think I should be punished for something I can't control. The problem is 
the lower courts don't want to take responsibilty, so they pass the case 
upstairs. Which sort of means I'm in the right. 
I'm glad it wasn't you. I never thought I'd be thankfuI for the way you 
behaved, running the road at all hours, coming home when you pleased, 
but I am. There was nobody in the house but your mother. I always bun- 
dled the newspapers for the recycling on Tuesdays, and I suppose it was in 
my head to do it before I went to bed. That's my guess, anyway, I wish I'd 
let the cat in that night. You could forgive me for that. 
Love, Dad. 
-R. M. Vaughan 
Smart 
Fashion sense as in "smartly dressed"; or intelligence as in "smart bomb." 
Knowing what to do and when to do it, automatic. Opposite of thoughtful. 
-Janine Marchessault 
Smart Bomb 
For now, the veil of television will not part. I can't save the Palestin- 
ian baby suffocating in its gas mask. I can't find Michael Speicher, 
the first American airman missing in action. I can't protect the Holo- 
caust survivor stuffed into a sealed room as the mlssiles fall. I can't 
hear the screams in Baghdad.] 
As these comments suggest, there is a high level of sensorial and emo- 
tional violence that is perpetrated by this culture as it selectively represses 
sights, sounds, and smells that threaten to implode electronic distance and 
undermine a televisual logic with its "lure of a referentiality perpetually 
deferred."2 
It  is this culture and, in particular, its televisual logic, that  poses the 
most serious questions as to the validity of artistic activity-especially in 
terms of its self-proclaimed role of critical consciousness and eye of a 
culture-in an age that is increasingly governed by a militarylindustrial 
definition of observation and representation: a definition that  amounts 
to a (re)definition of the very nature of visibility as invisibility or, in Paul 
Virilio's evocative words, a n  "aesthetics of disappearancen3 in which 
clouds of uncertainty serve as the index of exotic new weapons systems in 
a process that valorizes a blurred presence over a secret absence. In par- 
ticular, it challenges the ability of artistic practices to make critical and 
political sense of their own relationships to catastrophic or emotionally 
traumatic events of the calibre of the Gulf War, events that are ultimately 
defined by military observation and a simllar aesthetics of disappearance. 
Let us not forget, in this connection, Roland Barthes' insight that "trauma 
is a suspension of language" and that "the traumatic photograph.. .is the 
photograph about which there is nothing to say."4 
If this appears, in fact, not to  have been the case with the media cover- 
age of the Gulf War which floated, televisually, on a veritable sea of words, 
it is perhaps because there were no truly traumatic images- television's 
logic being precisely predicated on the substitution of the visual effects of 
catastrophe for the psychological implosion of a truly traumatic event 
which, in any case, would have already been distanced through its logic. 
But the complexities of the relationship of so-called artistic practices t o  
traumatic or televisually catastrophic events goes well beyond the televi- 
sion set to permeate the world of our everyday lives. When considered in 
this wider socio-political context, artists and their practices are in danger 
of floundering in a common political marginality through their inability 
as common citizens to critically engage the types of powerful perceptual 
strategies that ultimately pervade a communal domain of vision that 
stretches from the ordinary to the truly extraordinary. 
Paul Virilio suggests, in his provocative study War and Cinema: The 
Logistics of Perception, that success in war is now to be measured "not 
so much in scoring territorial, economic or other material victories as in 
appropriating the 'immateriality' of perceptual fields9'5--an observation 
confirmed by allied tactics in the Persian Gulf and, on the other side of the 
phosphorescent screen by an inability "to resist the ultimate bait of TV 
news: being an 'eye-witness to historyl"6 Virilio's thesis certainly renders 
intelligible the feeling that many television viewers had, as a consequence 
of prolonged exposure to the Gulf War, that television news had finally 
been infiltrated and conquered by "a veritable logistics of military per- 
ception, in which a supply of images would become the equivalent of an 
ammunition supply."7 As the technologies of observation were already in 
place, it was simply a question of controlling this observation in the name 
and authority of military security or operational secrecy. This coupling of 
military strategy and televisual representation confirms Virilio's assertion 
that since at least 1967 "direct vision" in the context of warfare "was 
now a thing of the past" because the "target area" had finally "become a 
cinema  location.'"^ Moreover, the military annexation of the perceptual 
infrastructure of television news reportage produced the distinct feeling 
that viewers were now also considered to be "extras" on "locationy'-as 
Goldstein remarked at the time: "after a night of televisual combat, I feel 
all the sensations of war, with none of the risk."9 
Notes 
1 Richard Goldstein, "Diary of a War Potato," The Village Voice vol. 36, no. 5 (1991): 28. 
2 Ann Mary Doane, "Information, Crisis, Catastrophe," Logics of Television: Essays in 
Ctrltural Criticism, ed. Patricia Mellencamp (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana Uni- 
versity Press1 London: BFI Publishing, 1990), 328. 
3 Paul Virilio, War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception, trans. Patrick Camiller (Lon- 
don: Verso, 1989), 4. 
4 Roland Barthes, "The Photographic Message," Image-Music-Text, ed. & trans. Stephen 
Heath (London: FontanalCollins, 1977), 30-31. 
5 Virilio, 7. 
6 Goldstein, 25. 
7 Virilio, 1 (emphasis in the original). 
8 Virilio, 11. 
9 Goldstein, 27. 
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Excerpted from "Polytechnical Observation: An Artistic and Popular Response to Political 
Events in the Age of the Smart Bomb," Public 6: Violence, 1992. 
Smoking 
Cancer. 
- Janine Marchessault 
Sorry 
They gathered in the town square to say they were sorry. Sorry for the way 
their government had stolen the Aboriginal children from their homes and 
put them into schools to train the black' out of them, to make them white. 
Sorry for the lies that had been told. Sorry for the policies of cultural ex- 
termination approved by their government. The few people who attended 
gathered near the war memorial that depicted a heroic young white Aus- 
tralian soldier, gun ready in his hands. Across the road, the War Memorial 
Civic Centre sparkled in the sun, the crest above the door depicting other 
white men defending their nation at all costs. The faint sounds of the 
didgeridoo coming through the sound system competed with the rumble of 
cars driving by, radios blaring. It was 1 p.m. on a sunny May afternoon at 
the end of the twentieth century. It was "Sorry Day" in Au~tralia.~ 
The organizers collected solemnly at  the front and introduced the 
important Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal dignitaries. Then, like a Christ- 
ian church service or religious ritual, everyone was invited to participate 
collectively in singing songs, reciting group apologies and, finally, a one 
minute silence of remembering. Individuals in the audience were then 
invited to speak their apologies publicly. One-at-a-time, white participants 
moved to the front of the gathering, and falteringly took the microphone 
for their testimonies. Some told how they had been surrounded by, but 
ignorant of, the pain and terror inflicted on Aboriginal people. Others 
recounted how they had never been taught the history of Aboriginal people, 
and all apologized for the history of pain. Many said it was important to 
heal the wounds of the past in events such as this so that the country could 
move into the next century. Finally, to end the ritual, a "Sorry Book" 
(filled with signed apologies from others in the area) was carried over and 
presented solemnly to an Aboriginal Elder. 
I was a participant in the above event, and was strangely placed as an 
insiderloutsider. As a white Canadian who had arrived in Australia about a 
year earlier, my life had been, in one sense, distant and removed from the 
specific local, regional and national events being confronted. Yet, because 
colonialism is a global matter, and Canada is also a British settler colony 
which built the nation through the appropriation of Indigenous people's 
lands and cultural genocide, a similar history had occurred in Canada.3 The 
Canadian government recently apologized to Native people for a similar 
process which occurred in the residential schools. On a broader global scale, 
the coming millennium has inspired a flurry of public apologies and attempts 
at "reconciliation" through truth and apology all over the world for atroci- 
ties perpetrated in the twentieth century. Often such public acts of apology 
are surrounded by debate about the necessity of "healing the wounds" of the 
past before the millennium so as to "move into the future." 
The Australian "Sorry Day," however, left me with a sense of deep shame. 
How was it possible that a few words of regret and apology (no matter how 
earnest, remorseful, or passionate) were expected to adequately account for 
over two hundred years of well planned, state-sanctioned, colonial violence 
and cultural genocide? But there was more to it than that. At the end of the 
event, one of the organizers came to the front to thank all who had attended. 
She said "we" should all be "congratulated" for attending "Sorry Day" 
because "we" had "given Aboriginal people the opportunity to hear our 
apology." The implicit "we" she spoke to was white, the same whites she 
was congratulating as the heroes of the day, whites brave enough to "give" 
to Aboriginal people, brave enough to confess their sins. How did the hero- 
ism of Aboriginal people who survived these decades of terrorism disappear 
at a ceremony supposedly "for" them? Who was "Sorry Day" really for? 
How is it that the apologizers emerge, after the ritual, washed clean and 
innocent, congratulating themselves on their action? How do whites get so 
much for so little? What is an apology? What does it do? Specifically, what 
does apology do for the apologizers? Does it imply responsibility for their 
actions? Or does saying "sorry" erase the past? 
Apology is most often seen as an "expression of one's regret, remorse or 
sorrow for having insulted, failed, injured or wronged another."4 However, 
dictionary definitions are not clear on whether an apology implies respon- 
sibility or guilt for that action. Such confusion may be because apology, in 
the past, was also commonly defined as a defence or justification for an 
action or belief. An example is Turtullian's Apology for Christianity, and 
the later development of a branch of theological thought called "Apologet- 
ics" -the rational defence and justification of Christian beliefs. Current 
dictionary definitions are still ambiguous. Apology sometimes means an 
excuse, explanation or justification for an action, rather than an admit- 
tance of wrong-doing and fault without defence. I find it more useful to see 
apology in a more anthropological manner: as essentially a diplomatic or 
political act, a means through which one can "secure one's own interests" 
by appearing to be sensitive and responsive to the interests of others.' 
If those who apologize do so out of their own interest, it is important to 
explore what apologizers receive from their apology. What perturbed me 
about the "Sorry Day" ceremony is that the act of apology demands so 
much from the recipient and so little from the apologizer. A few simple 
words of regret and apology and the long history of colonial violence- 
momentarily brought to  the foreground through the apology process- 
is put into the past, even somehow erased. In this way the guilty party 
requests and demands, the conversion of "righteous indignation and be- 
trayal" into nothing less than "unconditional forgiveness and reunion," 
and does so in return for nothing more than a few words.6 Like Catholic 
confession (and even modern therapeutic forms of the "talking cure"), the 
words-and the action of speaking the words-enact an immense change 
in the individual, and in power relations between parties. Foucault, in The 
History of Sexuality, shows how the act of confession transforms the one 
who confesses: "it exonerates, redeems and purifies him; it unburdens him 
of his wrongs, liberates him, and promises him ~alvation."~ The simple act 
of speaking a few words also transformed the individuals who confessed 
at the "Sorry Day": they moved from a state of uneasy guilt in the colonial 
encounter to a state of innocence in which they could congratulate them- 
selves for their good deed of apology. 
Apology and confession are also rituals that enact a shift from one's 
location as an outsider in a particular moral universe (excluded because 
of an act of transgression) to  a position as insider. While all societies 
and communities have procedures for degrading and demoralizing those 
deemed to have transgressed its norms, they also have "rituals of restora- 
tion, healing, forgiveness and return." Mike Hepworth and Bryan Turner 
argue that confession, is part of a "ritual of inclusion" through which 
"deviant members of the community are restored to their normal roles 
and status through ritualized expressions of sorrow, self-criticism and 
remorse."8 Similarly, in Medieval Christian ritual, a sequence of rites, en- 
tailing confession of guilt, then penance and reconciliation "marked the 
progressive reintegration of the   inner."^ 
"Sorry Day" apologies and confessions also may restore the partici- 
pant's sense of their place in a moral order, and assuage the discomfort of 
feeling that one (or one's society) may have been morally wrong and impli- 
cated in the atrocious history of genocide. Nevertheless, this particular 
Australian "ritual of inclusion" (if we describe apology and confession as 
such) has not, as in the religious rites described above, been preceded by a 
ritual of exclusion. The assimilation policies carried out against Aborigi- 
nal people were officially sanctioned by Australian society at large (as they 
were in Canada), and were often carried out by members of the church. 
They were therefore not seen a t  the time as transgressions of societal 
norms. The perpetrators of those policies have never been ritually ex- 
cluded or degraded. Therefore, the ritual of confession, healing and rec- 
onciliation is not one that re-admits sinners who have been previously cast 
out, because they have never been cast out. Instead, this form of apology 
acts to reclaim and revalidate rights and obligations that the apologizer 
enjoyed before the transgression. It is an attempt to restore "an antecedent 
moral order" by "expunging or eradicating the harmful effects of past 
actions.""J The Australian apologies thereby enforce a form of forgiving 
and forgetting, and act to restore the world to the way it was before the 
transgression was recognized as a crime. The simple act of apology, there- 
fore, does a lot for the apologizers. They receive a large dividend for very 
small investment of a few words: nothing less than the ability to construct 
themselves as innocent, to feel redemption, and to return to an antecedent 
moral order in which they are seen as innocent. Apology, "reconciliation," 
and nation building. 
Apology is part of a broader official government program of "Reconcil- 
iation" in Australia that is integral to the project of nation-building. The 
first major report of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation noted that 
reconciliation was an opportunity for all Australians to be "participants in 
a worthwhile nation-building exercise."ll Further, the stated goal of the 
Council was not justice for Aboriginal people first, but begins with the goal 
of "a united Australia" and then continues, "which respects this land of 
ours; values the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander heritage; and pro- 
vides justice and equity for Reconciliation, here, is not a program of 
justice or equality or even critical history. Rather it entails a limited recog- 
nition of Aboriginal "heritage." This is precisely what national mythology 
needs to narrate the move forward into a rosy twenty-first century future: 
a cleaned-up and reconciled past. National unity is the primary goal of rec- 
onciliation, and in it the nation of Australia once again has priority over 
the needs or demands of Aboriginal people. 
This version of apology, therefore, fits into a very ambiguous model of 
reconciliation.13 While the term reconciliation, on one hand, means all par- 
ties reconciling with or to other parties, it also means in practice that one 
party, namely Aboriginal people, work the hardest and pay the most for rec- 
onciliation, because it is they who must reconcile themselves to the nation's 
colonial past,14 and, as we see here, to its supposedly post-colonial future. 
"Sorry Day" exacerbates and symbolically reproduces Aboriginal 
people's historical and ongoing victimization a t  the hands of the settler 
nation. Such ceremonies, no matter how well-intentioned, are primarily 
concerned with the construction of white innocence, with producing unity 
for nation-building, and with cleansing the past to move into the future. 
Further, within the broader political context, they demonstrate that rec- 
onciliation requires Aboriginal people's resignation to the settler project of 
nation-building, especially at  the outset of the twenty-first century. "S" is 
not only for "sorry," but also for enforced silence, submission and surren- 
der to the nation's twenty-first century future. 
Notes 
1 Unllke North Amerlcan Aborigmal and Ind~genous people, Australian Abor~ginal people 
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Sovereignty 
Once state sovereignty is defined as a centring of power/authority within a 
given territory, the way is open for emphasis on other things, like justice 
and law, freedom and social progress. In this context, concern with sov- 
ereignty is expressed in three primary forms: as the procedures of defence 
and diplomacy required to maintain the geographical frontier-the outer 
limit-of a society; as a technical legal problem, especially in the con- 
struction of constitutional and institutional politics; and as a concept al- 
ways in uneasy motion between power and authority, and thus between 
state and civil society, or state and nation. This latter form has been of 
particular interest to political theorists. For although the concept of 
sovereignty provides a constitutional account of the state as somehow (ab- 
stractly) synonymous with society, there remains the difficulty of deter- 
mining exactly how the relationship between power and authority is to 
be specified or achieved in practice, a difficulty that has provided one of 
the core themes of European political thought since the age of social con- 
tract theory. Thus attention shifts to other dilemmas, notably those con- 
cerning the cultural or national content of the space contained within state 
boundaries and the precise democratic procedures that might permit some 
convergence of sovereign state and sovereign people. The claims of state 
sovereignty themselves recede into the background, into the silence of 
received wisdom and legal convention. All that is needed are the appropri- 
ate constitutional and institutional arrangements to ensure a practical con- 
tinuity over time and the clear affirmation of a spatial limit beyond which 
democracy and nation cannot trespass: matters that can be left safely in 
the hands of lawyers and soldiers as the twin guardians of sovereign enclo- 
sure. Though the weapons may be pointed out, the effects are clearly felt 
within. 
Viewed in this internal context, the problematic character of the princi- 
ple of state sovereignty takes two primary forms. The first involves con- 
tinuing tensions between power and authority and between sovereign state 
and sovereign people, tensions that have come to be resolved either through 
binary distinctions between state and civil society or through unitary claims 
to national identity. While these resolutions continue to be of crucial im- 
portance as pressing aspirations in many places, they also continue to be 
put in doubt by the continuing recourse to various forms of authoritatian 
state and the demands of an increasingly global capitalist economy. From 
this direction, claims about state sovereignty have come to be identified 
not only with the increasing strength of the state measured in terms of the 
state's capacity to coerce civil society, but also with an increasing weak- 
ness of the state in relation to the global structures in which it has become 
embedded. 
-R. B. J. Walker 
Excerpted from "Soverelgn Identltles and the Polltlcs of Forgett~ng," Publzc 9: Readlng 
Our Rlghts, 1994. 
-Lynne Cohen 
Space 
There used to be a bar in Washington on 7th Street called "D.C. Space" 
which made the argument that "Space is the Place." IF the subject had any- 
thing to do with it and if I counted as one at the tender age below which, 
intoxicated, with teen bewilderment and a willingness to behold wonder, 
amplified as luck should have it by a vibrant location, THEN what placing 
space meant was that this was it, this space was there to be, to be person- 
ally claimed (a bar, restaurant, dance club, and theatre), to be occupied by 
persons wishing to be, to be here, and also for some to be everywhere. 
Can we now be everywhere without a place or in a place that is only a sec- 
tion of space? 
-Peter Trnka 


2001: A Space Odyssey 
Only a work like Stanley Kubrick's 2001: A Space Odyssey that puts its mind 
around time periods, locations, and ideas so vast and at the border of our 
imaginations, can really embody the indescribable nature of this past cen- 
tury. Its presentation of advances in technology and the dark side that comes 
with it; the omnipresence of violence and fear; and the overriding will of 
humankind toward a more perfect transcendence, seem all too germane as one 
looks back over this century. Kubrick's film not only stretches commercially 
produced filmmaking to a point that few (arguably) have taken it since, it also 
presents a cultural meditation on the future and still tells us a great deal about 
human nature at  present and how we have come to be the way we are. 
-Dominic Molon 
Speed 
Yes. 
- Janine Marchessault 
Spontaneous 
"It is possible through mindfulness practice, to bring about some kind of 
orderly observation of the phenomenology of the mind and to produce a 
poetics. From that instant by instant recognition of thought forms comes 
a notion of spontaneous poetry which Jack Icerouac and Gertrude Stein 
practiced. And that form of poetry is an Oriental form that is composed 
on the tongue rather than on paper. It is also a Western form, a very Amer- 
ican form. Blues and Calypso poetics were always made up on the spot. 
There always was a formulaic structure as in all Bardic poetics but it was 
dependent on the Black blues singer to get it on and make up on the spot 
all the rhymes and all the personal comments, all the moaning, empty bed 
samsava lamentations of the moment while singing. So that Tibetan poet- 
ics and American poetics are based on the spontaneous. The key to this is 
that you have to accept that the first thought is the best thought, you have 
to recognize that the mind is shapely. Because the mind has a shape, what 
passes through the mind is the mind's own, so that it is all in one mind, it 
is all linked connectedness and consequence. Observe your mind rather 
than force it, you will always come up with something that links to previ- 
ous thought forms. It is a question of trusting your own mind finally and 
trusting your tongue to express the mind's fast puppet.. .spitting forth 
intelligence without embarrassment." {Allan Ginsberg] 
- Janine Marchessault 
SPO-SUB 
Excerpted from audio-recording, April 13, 1987 Writing Workshop, OISE, University o f  
Toronto. 
stubborn-couple 
n. 1. a unit of engagement 
Once upon a time in the future, a stubborn couple lived next door to a 
very generous couple. When this generous couple moved into the neigh- 
bourhood they brought over three pieces of cake to this stubborn couple. 
This stubborn couple loved the cake so much that after consuming one 
piece each, each wanted the third piece all to themself. 
It would have been so easy to just share this third piece but nothing less 
would do for this stubborn couple so they decided on a bet. 
Whoever kept silent the longest would win the third piece of cake. 
So this stubborn couple just sat there watching each other, keeping 
silent and staring at the cake. 
Suddenly, a thief came into the house and started to steal everything. 
The thief was suprised at first to see this stubborn couple but decided 
that they were deaf, mute or blind, or all of the above. 
As soon as the thief left, one of them blurted out, "Some one stop that 
thief!" and that is when the other one said, "The cake is all mine now!" 
- Jinhan KO 
Sublime 
The century that is now coming to a close, will probably have been sub- 
lime (as will most likely be the one that is about to begin). It will have 
aroused in us mixed emotions, feelings of terror and enthusiasm. As it has 
been defined in the origins of modernity, by Burke in particular, the sub- 
lime feeling is indeed a feeling of terror experienced in front of spectacles 
that evoke "pain, sickness and death," a threat to the spectator's exis- 
tence.' The sublime is thus "the strongest emotion the mind is capable of 
feeling."2 But, in some cases, this feeling of terror may be accompanied by 
pleasure: "when danger or pain press too nearly, they are (. . .) simply ter- 
rible; but at certain distances, and with certain modifications, (. . .) they are 
delightfuly3 "they are capable of producing delight; not pleasure but a sort 
of delightful horror."4 For Burke, spectacles that cause this ''delightful ter- 
ror" are numerous and varied: obscurity and darkness, vacuity, solitude 
and silence, vastness and infinity, magnificence and disorder, power and, 
generally speaking, everything that evokes an excess or a privation. "The 
opposite extremes operate equally in favour of the  sublime."^ Similarly for 
Kant, everything that suggests an "infinite magnitude" or an "infinite 
might))) everything that appears to be immense or irresistible, may be an 
SUB 
occasion of the sublime. But Kant's analysis is somehow different. Here, 
such spectacles not only occasion a conflict between the subject and the 
object, but also, within the subject itself, a conflict of faculties, between 
"reason" that conceives of the sublime idea of infinity, the idea of an ab- 
solutely great or strong, and the "imagination" that is incapable of pre- 
senting such an idea, of offering a corresponding "intuition." According to 
Kant, upon reflection, such a conflict between nature and ideas, between 
imagination and reason, manifests the very finiteness of the subject, the 
limits of knowledge and power, the weakness of imagination and of the 
human body, and thus arouses in us a feeling of pain. But at the same time, 
such a conflict reveals the infinite ambition and power of reason, which is 
capable of conceiving, beyond intuition and all possible experience, the 
"supra-sensible," and thus it arouses in us a feeling of pleasure, "the feel- 
ing of our supersensible vocation," writes Kant.6 
"For although we found our own limitation when we consider the im- 
mensity of nature and the inadequacy of our ability to adopt a standard 
proportionate to estimating aesthetically the magnitude of nature's domain, 
yet we also found, in our power of reason, (. . .) a superiority over nature 
itself in its immensity. In the same way, though the irresistibility of nature's 
might makes us, considered as natural beings, recognize our physical impo- 
tence, it reveals in us at the same time an ability to judge ourselves inde- 
pendent of nature, and reveals in us a superiority over nature."' 
The twentieth century will have produced many sublime spectacles, 
often unprecedented. With social, political and economic transformations, 
scientific and cultural revolutions, many advances have been realized and 
many enthusiasms nurtured, but also of course, new kinds of disasters cre- 
ated and new terrors aroused. Already, new infinities have been opened- 
in space, beyond the starry sky, the most faraway planets and the Milky 
Way, as well as inside matter, beyond molecules, atoms and quarks; in 
time also, backwards, before the Big Bang, as well as forward, after the Big 
Crunch-new infinities certainly conceivable, but which remain forever 
imperceptible, even unimaginable, as the end of the world will always be. 
But also, new powers have been unleashed-nuclear power for example, 
with its uncontrolled chain reactions, or genetics, which transforms the 
nature of nature and, especially, human nature. 
But in this past century, some spectacles which had not previously been 
so, became sublime. The human body-the inside of the body and the 
dead body in particular-became one of the most fascinating and disturb- 
ing spectacles: with the decline of religions and of their rituals and the 
development of medicine and its technologies, the body has become an 
object, not merely an object to be despised and kept at  a distance, but a 
fetishized object, incessantly manipulated, at once entirely visible and for- 
ever strange, almost incomprehensible. Capitalism also, with its expanded 
world market, is a most sublime spectacle, as nature was in the eighteenth 
century for the pessimist: an infinite power, but merely mechanical and 
particularly blind, blind to human interests. 
But the most sublime will remain the spectacle of history itself. And the 
spectator who today stops for a moment to  contemplate, in retrospect, the 
time that has past, the century which is ending, still asks the same ques- 
tion, that of the purpose of history: isn't all this merely sound and fury, a 
nature abandoned to itself, or can one discern, beneath this apparent dis- 
order, some order, an intention, progress even? Obviously, the contempo- 
rary historian does not often believe in finalism, the doctrine that a divine 
will, some "invisible hand," is a t  work in history, in order to  fulfil its 
purpose, its humanist purpose. But that history may have been deserted 
by God does not prevent progress, in human societies at  least, through 
the actions of human beings. But is this really the case? Is the history of 
humankind a progression, a regression or a stagnation? But how can we 
know? And could we ever know? As Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard reminded us, 
after Kant, in order to know this with certainty, the historian would have 
to be able to contemplate all history, the origin of history, the whole of 
history, and history to  come-which is obviously impossible: history is 
always incomplete, fragmented and often contradictory. It is thus difficult 
to draw lessons from the twentieth century; as some historical events have 
nourished many a hope, so others have ruined many a utopia. As Lyotard 
has remarked: 
In the course of the past fifty years, each grand narrative of emanci- 
pation-regardless of the genre it privileges-has, as it were, had its 
principle invalidated. All that is real is rational, all that is rational is 
real: "Auschwitz" refutes the speculative doctrine. At least this crime, 
which is real, is not rational. All that is proletarian is communist, all 
that is communist is proletarian: "Berlin 1953", "Budapest 1956", 
"Czechoslovakia 1968", "Poland 1980" (to name but a few) refute 
the doctrine of historical materialism: the workers rise up against the 
Party. All that is democratic is by the people and for the people, and 
vice versa: "May 1968" refutes the doctrine of parliamentary liberal- 
ism. Everyday society brings the representative institution to a halt. 
Everything that promotes the free flow of supply and demand is good 
for general prosperity, and vice versa: the "crises of 1911 and 1929" 
refute the doctrine of economic liberalism, and the "crisis of 
1974-1979" refutes the post-Keynesian modification of that doc- 
trine. The investigator records the names of these events as so many 
signs of the failing of modernity.8 
But, as Lyotard noted, if the spectacle of history itself cannot assure us in 
any way of the "progress of the human kind," the feelings that it inspires 
may well provide, if not a proof, at least a sign of this progress: the terror 
and the enthusiasm that this sublime century will have aroused in many of 
us, reveals at least a sensitivity to moral ideas, and may thereby be witness, 
better than history itself, to a certain progress. This century will not have 
been in vain, if some hope remains. 
Notes 
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-0livier Asselin 
Sun 
Cancer. 
- Janine Marchessault 
Switches 
Do you ever wonder what a life, your life, would have been like before 
automobiles, before anesthesia, before gunpowder, or- by a greater stretch 
of the imagination-before clocks, agriculture, or writing? Each of us 
enters human history with a specific and limited range of tools, devices, 
and practices at our disposal. The life span of the individual corresponds 
to a position within an independent history of technology which can be 
constructed retrospectively (rather like a life) through various series of 
events of differing orders of implication and significance. Some technolog- 
ical events assume such political or economic magnitude that it may seem 
pointless to consider the experience of individuals, as opposed to entire 
societies, encountering the engines of transformation. Indeed, any thought 
of a particular person living through significant technological change is 
likely to assume a comic form, a sign of the difficulty of adjusting to tech- 
nology, even as a memory. Imagine yourself reacting to the invention of the 
wheel; the scene might well acquire a Flintstone-like quality. 
To attempt to identify the dominant technological forces and agents 
affecting one's own life is as troublesome as identifying one's own ideol- 
ogy and the sphere of its influence. Technologies and ideologies collude. 
Certain grand orders of change overwhelm the individual imagination as 
it attempts to focus on whatever social transformation corresponds to a 
particular technological innovation. If I were to identify nuclear energy 
(especially its vast destructive potential), telecommunications (the limitless 
dissemination of information), and the microchip (with its rapid process- 
ing of data and programming of operations) as the dominant forces of 
technological change affecting my own society during the latter half of the 
twentieth century, would I be correct in doing so? Do I understand how 
an individual changes in response to these forces? I try to imagine my life 
in terms of a collective past: perhaps nuclear power and its foundation 
in a science of atomic elements bears to me the relation that the "ele- 
ments" fire and water-both sources of power and destruction-did to the 
ancient Greeks. Perhaps telecommunications and the microchip, given 
their potential to regulate and standardize life on a global scale, corre- 
spond in significance to early mechanical clocks or, reaching further back 
in our collective imagination, to the invention of writing. I know that in 
many respects the computer has changed the shape of my society within 
the span of my lifetime, but how, if at  all, has it changed me? 
To be sure, personal recollection may serve the biographer and auto- 
biographer, but it is far from the preferred mode of documentation and 
argumentation for histories not centered on individuals. Historians, ecol- 
ogists, anthropologists, and social theorists normally look beyond local 
concerns. If technology factors in their accounts, they imagine its great 
advances-irrigation, metallurgy, electronics-as having had profound, 
but general, consequences. Technology can be as good an explanation as 
any for the rise, fall, or reorganization of great cultures. 
A different type of historian-the critic Walter Benjamin will be my exam- 
ple-works on an intimate level, yet still manages to offer hypotheses gener- 
alists recognize. Benjamin's passing remark on an advance in telephone 
technology is a case in point. He used one of life's little details to character- 
ize the conditions of modernity as experienced during the 1930s. Benjamin 
was struck by the feel of the dial telephone; to lift the receiver, an "abrupt" 
action, was already to initiate the calling process, almost instantaneously. 
This new type of telephone differed from the older crank-operated model, 
which required a gradual, "steady movement" to begin operation.' The 
switch to the newer apparatus-a change the critic experienced himself, a 
marker for his generation just as the push-button or touchtone model might 
be for mine-represented more to Benjamin than an advance in the efficiency 
of interpersonal communication. "Dialing" drew that communication ever 
further away from its being coordinated with familiar bodily movements, 
which were themselves associated with older technologies and practices. 
Disjunction of the physical body from the conscious mind's means of com- 
munication: this is a serious matter, a transformation or reorganization of 
the organism itself, understood as a sensorium and a psychology. The speed 
and the very nature of telephone connection via the dial system might jar 
the individual's sense of life's natural rhythms. If Benjamin's observation 
on the telephone strikes us as odd, it is only because the push-button model, 
today's standard, is yet again more disruptive. In contrast with percussive 
touch-tone dialing, rotary dialing no longer seems abrupt but smooth and 
fluid, a reversal of its phenomenological significance. 
Telephones and their various switching mechanisms-manual in the case 
of cranking and the operator-controlled switchboard; automatic in the case 
of the dial system-lead me to think of simpler types of switches. Children 
of twentieth-century industrialized societies encounter switches as a basic 
feature of their home environments. As for myself, I grew up understanding 
that the binary on-off character of switches (such as the most common type 
of light switch) roughly corresponds to the mechanical actions we might 
call "push and pull." A toggle switch is either pushed up or pulled down (or 
"flipped" or "flicked"); its variant, the rotating switch, is either turned 
clockwise or counterclockwise. To operate the toggle's main alternative, 
the button-type switch, one pushes inward and then, in order to reverse the 
result, either pushes again, releasing the button and allowing it to resume 
its original position, or pushes some other button. 
At some point-it would be difficult to recollect precisely-I became 
aware of the substitution of electromechanical and electronic switches for 
more purely mechanical ones. The electromechanical "push-push" type of 
switch can be distinguished from the mechanical toggle or "push-pull" type 
in that it solicits only one kind of touch. Touching the push-push button will 
activate either whatever procedure negates its predecessor, or that procedure 
which is programmed to follow in a predetermined sequence. With push-push 
switches, neither mechanical nor spatial orientation differentiates "on" from 
"off." No ordinary physical barrier needs to be crossed when moving from 
one state to its alternative; the two states merely follow one another arbitrar- 
ily. Some push-push switches may have distinguishable "in" and "out" posi- 
tions (like the "Shift" key on a standard computer keyboard); but others (like 
"Number Lock") move only to alter whatever function they control, imme- 
diately afterwards resuming their initial state. Still others are activated merely 
by touching and do not move at all. The push-push switch, especially the sin- 
gle-position and stationary varieties, suits the age of semiology and the simu- 
lacrum: it has no origin, ground, or fundamental orientation; it establishes 
nothing but difference. If a switch is activated while in an "on" mode-not a 
"position" (up, down; right, left), but a "mode" (on, off; positive, negative) 
-then one can only bring about an "off" mode with respect to the switch's 
initial state. The switch itself, as well as its operation, signifies a general 
"change" or "alternative" rather than any one specific change. 
If the push-push switch generalizes and perhaps disorients one's experience 
of change, still another type of electromechanical device, the heat-sensitive 
or thermal switch, generalizes the use of the body's otherwise differentiated 
sensory systems. For anyone accustomed to associating switches with touch, 
pressure, and the application of a small amount of force (and to associating 
this in turn with our most mundane experiences of weight, momentum, re- 
sistance, and gravity), heat-sensitive operations mystify because they require 
no pressure. Rather, they make use of the other, usually hidden, factor 
involved in every human touch-body temperature. Heat-sensitive switches 
are particularly common in elevators, where they illuminate rather than 
move when touched. Such illumination merely indicates that the "touch" or 
command has been registered. This visual signal is arbitrary, since in its 
place, for example, a tone could sound. People are unlikely to be aware that 
they are operating heat-sensitive switches until their finger's ability to 
"touch" is compromised: if a person presses an elevator button with a gloved 
hand on an unusually cold day, the chilled glove prevents the body's warmth 
from reaching the hand's outermost "skin." This touch then fails to convey 
temperature sufficient to register the command in the required way. As a 
result, the button does not illuminate, and the elevator does not move. Such 
an experience causes a person to feel suddenly insubstantial, and incapable 
of leaving a physical trace on the world. In this instance the heat-sensitive 
switch dematerializes the living experience of touch; it de-physicalizes the 
body because of a mistaken sense-difficult to avoid-that the body lacks 
weight and substance. Pushing the button harder will make no difference.2 
Notes 
1 Walter Benjamin, "On Some Motifs in Baudelaire" (1939), Illuminations, ed. Hannah 
Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 1969), 174. 
2 Heat-sensitive switches, naturally enough, repond to the warmth of breath as well as to 
touch. They respond, in other, words, to the most telling signs of life-breath and body 
heat. Despite its weight, a corpse cannot activate this type of switch. 
- Richard Shiff 
Excerpted from "On Passing Through Skin: Technology of Art and Sensation:' Public 13: 
Touch in Contemporary Art, 1996. 
System 
"System" really means any articulation of propositions. It was imported 
into English from Greek (and probably French) at  the beginning of the 
seventeenth century to signify "the whole scheme of created things, the 
~niverse."~ This bolstered the theological tradition through the authority of 
both ancient Hellenic music and modern up-and-coming sciences. In these 
sciences system came to mean either a set of objects andlor (a fundamen- 
tal confusion!) a set of principles, a scheme or method, which shapes and 
informs a department of knowledge or belief that deals with such a cor- 
relative set of objects as an organized whole. By the mid-seventeenth cen- 
tury, this was immediately applied to a comprehensive exposition of some 
subject, a written work claiming to be as total and authoritative for that 
particular "branch" of knowledge as the Book or books of any among 
the rival theologies claimed to be for the universe as a whole. Moreover, 
this horizon carried overtones of a harmonious whole that Plato had 
called mousike (clearly grounded in politics) and which had had a systema 
to organize it. At the end of the seventeenth century, the ideological van- 
guard department of both knowledge and scientific belief was Galileian 
physics including astronomy, which delineated the solar system and vari- 
ous mechanical systems of using force and gaining power from manipula- 
tions of gravity, wind, optical knowledge, etc. 
During and after the eighteenth century the notion of "system" began to 
grow much more extensive but also more rigid. It extended first to biology 
where system came to mean a set of organs or parts of the same structure 
or function, as rendered visible by the meshing of new ideological and 
technological ways of looking, for example, the nervous or the sanguine 
system apprehended by dissection and the microscope. Eventually any 
department of knowledge (geology, geometry, architecture.. .) could have 
one or more systems in the sense of an organized set of objects-again, 
both really "out there" and validated by a science that had these objects 
for its object. But simultaneously, the meaning of system jelled into schemes 
of formal classification, perhaps most famously the Linnean system for liv- 
ing beings, to be joined later by the Mendeleev system of chemical elements 
and other triumphs of taxonomic organization that became the fundament 
for whole sciences and their sweeping advances. 
The ideological dominance of system also meant the setting in place of 
a deep topological structure-a qualitative geometry permeating all imag- 
inable relationships-in the historical collective unconscious of long dura- 
tion. It then begat two important semantic derivations. First, what was 
anyway a dead metaphor derived from the Greek for "standing up to- 
gether" (ista'nai plus syn),  came to be used metaphorically for any suffi- 
ciently encompassing set of principles, scheme or method; increasingly, 
this incorporated humans as systemic parts. Second, a reaction by the 
oppressed identified "the System," capitalized, as what oppresses them: 
the dominant political, economic, and social order. This reaction was first 
recorded in gibes at system builders (Tristram Shandy) or indeed system 
mongers by the humanist intelligentsia, but it came to a head in the social- 
ist agitation of the English working class of the mid-nineteenth century, 
whence it continued to (one hopes) our day. Today this reaction is (for our 
little historical moment) backgrounded in favour of systems obviously 
constructed by people yet nevertheless still largely outside of our control: 
computer operating systems, systems analysis or similar technocratic sys- 
tems of late warfare-state capitalism.2 Nor is there much hope we can get 
soon out of such anti-democratic programmings that progress smoothly 
from designing weapons systems, with humans inserted into their comput- 
erized net as "information processing systems," to designing the future of 
the present social ~ y s t e m ; ~  or that we can in any foreseeable future get out 
of systems analyses. 
In conclusion: "system" is predominantly used as an unverifiable tau- 
tology that poses (or, even worse, tacitly presupposes) a delimited whole 
apprehended as an organized or articulated unity of distinguishable parts 
which are not simply In a fortuitous juxtaposition but obey a scheme or 
order, a "lawful" principle, a rule-so that they can be called a set, a com- 
plex unity, a n  organization. Even clearly manipulated technological or 
directly political sub-systems claim the prestige and sanction of "nature," 
including human nature, and of hidden teleologies-for example, of The 
Technology or The Market-obscuring how (by whom, through whom, 
for whom) they came about and functioned: as operative hypotheses car- 
ried out and constantly updated in the interest of precise social classes. 
When astronomy or cosmology subjects to a universal law of movement, 
anything from the Earth and Moon system up to the ensemble of red-shift 
galaxies, such a discipline exemplarily explicates the presupposition pre- 
sent in any talk about a closed system of relationships. That the Big Bang 
theory of cosmology came to be dominant after Hiroshima is a wonderful 
case of post hoc ergo propter hoc (causal dependency on history). 
A note on Marxism as quasi-system: All systems assuming an unchang- 
ing nature, a fixed attribution of what is "natural," are hidden the~ log ies .~  
Orthodox Marxism grew during the positivistic Second and Third Inter- 
nationals into another scientistic orthodoxy or quasi-theological system. A 
collective desire (for all of us) as well as a distributive desire (for each of 
US) for salvation, is an unalienable necessity for life as we can imagine it 
bettered. But the formalization (shaping) of this desire into a closed sys- 
tem, characteristic of the Euro-American monotheistic long duration of 
the last two thousand years, was always constricting and too often per- 
nicious. It is supposedly validated by the closure of nature as seen by a 
potentially all-knowing observer (God, Science, History) but it is in fact 
magically analogous to  this closed nature. The working classes' revolt 
against the constrictive and oppressive System of (in)human relationships 
fell prey to their enemies' systematicity, a hierarchy of fixed classes. This 
is due not only to the millennia1 socialization of several continents into 
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comforting closures, but also to the hijacking of the workers' movement 
by new social groupings ("despotic bureaucracy" or "labour aristoc- 
racy") whose interest was involved in closure. This began in the nine- 
teenth-century socialist parties-ironically, when both poetry (Heine, 
Baudelaire, Rimbaud) and serious philosophy (Marx, Kierkegaard) had 
abandoned rigid systems-but came to a head in Stalinism (and in par- 
allel though overtly pro-capitalist ways in Fascism). Dealing with this 
multiple closure is indispensable for lessons to be drawn from twentieth- 
century Fordism (ca. 1890-1973), for which central Marxist insights are 
still needed. 
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Tattoo 
The tattoo of course has always been commonly discerned as making 
meaning. Those who have studied the body marks of so-called "primi- 
tive" peoples tell us that the primary purpose of these inscriptions is one 
of differentiation. These marks assert the difference between what the 
anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss (lilte the Roro) also names "the raw 
and the cooked": the difference between nature and culture, between ani- 
mal life and human life. They also act to discriminate and characterize the 
uniqueness of one culture from another, and within each culture, one indi- 
vidual from another. These marks are individualist expressions-of com- 
munity, of age, of sex, of status-but they are also the differential marks 
of society's law set upon the body. The societal order, its meanings and its 
structure, is inscribed upon the epidermis, linking it permanently, physi- 
cally and visibly to that which must be felt and obeyed. In this way, the 
